How do tax progressivity and household heterogeneity affect Laffer curves?

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How much additional tax revenue can the government generate by increasing the level of labor income taxes? In this paper, we argue that the degree of tax progressivity is a quantitatively important determinant of the answer to this question. To make this point, we develop a large scale overlapping generations model with single and married households facing idiosyncratic income risk, extensive and intensive margins of labor supply, as well as endogenous accumulation of human capital through labor market experience. We calibrate the model to U.S. macro, micro, and tax data and characterize the labor income tax Laffer curve for various degrees of tax progressivity. We find that the peak of the U.S. Laffer curve is attained at an average labor income tax rate of 58%. This peak (the maximal tax revenues the government can raise) increases by 7% if the current progressive tax code is replaced with a flat labor income tax. Replacing the current U.S. tax system with one that has Denmark’s progressivity would lower the peak by 8%. We show that modeling the extensive margin of labor supply and endogenous human capital accumulation is crucial for these findings. With joint taxation of married couples (as in the U.S.), higher tax progressivity leads to significantly lower labor

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force participation of married women and substantially higher labor force participation of single women, an effect that is especially pronounced when future wages of females depend positively on past labor market experience.

**Keywords.** Laffer curve, progressive taxation, heterogeneous households.

**JEL classification.** E62, H20, H60.

1. Introduction

How much additional tax revenue can the government of a country generate by increasing the level of labor income taxes? That is, how far are we from the peak of the Laffer curve? In this paper we provide a quantitative, model-based answer to this question, and argue that this answer depends crucially on the degree of the *progressivity* of the tax code. Since the shape of the labor income tax schedule varies greatly across countries, a fact which we document empirically in Section 3, Laffer curves are therefore likely highly country-specific.\(^\text{1}\) We verify this claim in the model by tracing out the response of tax revenue to changes in the level of labor income tax rates (i.e. deriving the Laffer curve) under the current U.S. tax code, and then by documenting how the relation between the level of tax rates and tax revenue is altered as the degree of tax progressivity changes from that of the U.S. status quo to tax progressivity characterizing other countries.

Our quantitative analysis is conducted in the context of an overlapping generations model, populated by single and married households that make labor supply decisions along the intensive and extensive margins, endogenously accumulate work experience and are subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. In the model households make consumption-savings choices and decide on whether or not to participate in the labor market (the extensive margin), how many hours to work conditional on participation (the intensive margin), and thus how much labor market experience to accumulate which in turn impacts future earnings capacities. The government raises tax revenues through issuing government debt, and collecting a consumption-, a capital income- and a labor income tax to pay for exogenous government expenditures. To model labor income taxes, we use a tax function belonging to a two parameter family (as in Benabou (2002) and Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2017)) that permits varying separately the level of tax rates and its progressivity. We calibrate the model to U.S. macroeconomic, microeconomic wage, and tax data and construct the Laffer curve by varying the *level* of labor income taxes, holding their *progressivity* constant. We then deduce the impact of tax progressivity on the Laffer curve by varying the tax progressivity parameter in the labor income tax function, covering the range of the empirical estimates for other OECD countries as well as the case of a flat tax.

We find that the peak of the U.S. Laffer curve is attained at an average labor income tax rate of 58%. At this average rate the government could increase tax revenue by approximately 59%, relative to the status quo, and keeping tax progressivity constant. Crucially for the purpose of this paper, this peak of the Laffer curve (the maximal tax revenues the government can raise) increases by 7% if the current progressive tax code is

\(^{1}\)We treat cross-country differences in tax progressivity as *exogenous* in this paper, submitting that they might have emerged due to country-specific tastes for redistribution and social insurance, or distinctions in the political process that maps societal preferences into actual tax policy.
replaced with a flat labor income tax. In contrast, implementing a tax system with progressivity similar to that in Denmark would lower peak revenues by 8%. We also show that the impact of tax progressivity on maximal tax revenue that can be generated (on the order of 15% when moving from a proportional to Denmark’s highly progressive tax code) is substantially robust to the use of the extra tax revenues.3

Finally we argue that the extensive margin of labor supply for females responds strongly to a change in labor income tax progressivity, and thus is potentially a crucial determinant of the impact the progressivity of labor income taxes has on government revenues. In the model economy with joint taxation this mechanism works in the opposite direction for married and single women, however. With more progressive taxes, single females that tend to have low potential wages continue to work, and often start to participate as their average (and marginal) tax rate declines. This positive adjustment along the extensive margin of labor supply is especially pronounced when work experience positively impacts future wages. In contrast, married females are taxed jointly with their husbands, and thus families where the female has low earning potential typically find it optimal to remain, or to become single-earner households when taxes become more progressive. Quantitatively, these two very sizeable effects nearly offset each other, and tax revenues in our model are only slightly less responsive to tax progressivity than in a standard single household life-cycle model with uninsurable income risk.4

In contrast, in an economy with only single individuals and an extensive margin of labor supply as well as endogenous human capital accumulation, tax revenues are far less responsive to tax progressivity than in our model economy (and in the standard single household model without the extensive margin).

The quantitative importance of the extensive margin of labor supply of females (especially when combined with endogenous human capital formation through experience accumulation), as well as the strong heterogeneity by marital status in their response to a change in the progressivity of the labor income tax schedule justifies, in our view, the inclusion of these perhaps somewhat non-standard model elements into the otherwise fairly standard heterogeneous agent life cycle model we employ.

Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the concept of the Laffer curve and summarizes the recent related literature. In Section 3 we discuss our measure

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2Denmark has the most progressive taxes in the OECD, according to the empirical analysis in Section 3.
3The alternatives we consider are: (i) lump-sum redistribution to households, (ii) expansion of government debt and associated interest service, and (iii) the extension of wasteful government spending, with lump-sum redistribution being fixed at the benchmark level. As a secondary result, when using the extra tax revenue for public debt service we find that the U.S. can maximally sustain a debt to (benchmark) GDP ratio of 345%, holding tax progressivity constant, and that this amount is decreasing in the degree of progressivity of the tax schedule.
4Modeling the extensive margin of labor supply and endogenous human capital accumulation, on net, also has only a moderate effect on the location of the peak of the Laffer curve (i.e. the revenue maximizing level of the tax rate). The presence of this model element, however, strongly affects the level of the Laffer curve (i.e. how much revenue can be collected at a given average tax rate). In contrast, as shown in Section 8.4 increasing the intensive margin labor supply elasticity not only decreases the level of the Laffer curve, but also significantly moves the location of its peak to the left. Therefore it would be impossible to mimic the presence of the extensive margin of labor supply in our model by simply altering the labor supply elasticity in a standard life cycle model with labor supply choice only along the intensive margin.
of tax progressivity and develop a progressivity index by which we rank OECD countries. Section 4 studies, analytically, the impact of tax progressivity on labor supply and tax revenue. First we show that in a representative agent economy higher tax progressivity reduces tax revenue, holding the level of tax rates constant. We then demonstrate in tractable models with household heterogeneity, that along the intensive margin hours of high-income earners relative to low-income earners fall with a rise in tax progressivity, and that low (potential) income households participate more along the extensive margin if taxes become more progressive. In Section 5 we then describe our quantitative OLG economy with heterogeneous households. Section 6 is devoted to the calibration and estimation of the model parameters, and Section 7 displays the model performance along a number of dimensions not targeted by the calibration. The main quantitative results of the paper with respect to the impact of tax progressivity and household heterogeneity are presented in Section 8. We conclude in Section 9. The Appendix (in the Online Supplemental Material (Holter, Krueger, and Stepanchuk (2019)) discusses the transformation of a growing economy with extensive labor supply margin into a stationary economy, as well as the details of the estimation of the stochastic wage processes from micro data.

2. Background, mechanisms, and related literature

The idea that total tax revenues are a single-peaked function of the level of tax rates dates back to at least Arthur Laffer. The peak of the Laffer curve and the associated tax rate at which it is attained are of interest both from a positive and from a normative perspective. From the perspective of positive fiscal policy analysis, it measures the maximal tax revenue that a government can raise. Normatively, allocations associated with tax rates to the right of the peak lead to allocations that are Pareto-dominated by those emerging from tax rates to the left of the peak that generate the same tax revenue, at least under standard household preferences. Thus the peak of the Laffer curve constitutes the positive and normative limit to income tax revenue generation by a benevolent government operating in a market economy.

A quantitative characterization of Laffer curves for the U.S. and a group of European countries (the EU14) is contained in Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). The authors employ a model with infinitely lived representative agents, flat taxes and a labor supply choice only along the intensive margin. They find that the peak of the labor income tax Laffer curve in both regions is located at a tax rate between 50% and 70%, depending on parameter values. The authors also show, under suitable assumptions on preferences, that the Laffer curve remains unchanged in the presence of progressive taxation, if the representative agent paradigm is replaced with a population that is ex-ante heterogeneous with respect to their ability to earn income. In contrast, we argue that in a quantitative life cycle model with realistically calibrated wage heterogeneity and risk, an extensive margin labor supply as well as endogenous human capital accumulation, tax progressivity significantly changes the level and location of the peak of the Laffer curve, relative to Trabandt and Uhlig’s (2011) analysis.

5In Appendix A.2 we use a static model with a representative household to show that unless the government owns all non-labor resources in the economy there is a single peaked labor income tax Laffer curve.
Why and how does the degree of tax progressivity matter for the ability of the government to generate labor income tax revenues in an economy characterized by household heterogeneity and wage risk? First, holding labor supply behavior constant, under a more progressive tax code taxes collected from high earners rise and taxes from low earners fall. However, changes in tax progressivity also induce a behavioral response in hours worked and, potentially, in labor market participation. In a representative agent model, making the tax schedule more progressive reduces hours worked, due to an increase in the wedge the labor income tax creates in the household’s intratemporal optimality condition (see Section 4).

In contrast, in the presence of household heterogeneity, a change in tax progressivity differentially impacts hours worked by high- and low-earners since it induces differential income and substitution effects on the workers in different parts on the earnings distribution, as we will illustrate in Section 6.5. Furthermore, the presence of an extensive margin typically leads to a higher overall labor supply elasticity for low wage agents who decide whether to participate in the labor market. A progressive tax system with low tax rates around the participation margin may in fact help to increase revenue if more agents decide to participate in the labor market especially when this labor force participation (LFP), through enhanced experience, also leads to higher wages in the future.9 In Section 4.2 we use a simplified model with extensive margin labor choice and heterogeneous wages to illustrate how an increase in tax progressivity can lead to increased LFP.

In addition, in life-cycle models the presence of uninsurable wage risk leads to higher labor supply elasticity for older than for younger households, since the latter have a strong incentive to earn income and save for precautionary reasons, see e.g. Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009). Since older agents have higher wages due to more accumulated labor market experience, a more progressive tax system that disproportionately reduces labor supply for old and thus high wage earners, may therefore lead to a substantial reduction in tax revenue. Furthermore, when agents undergo a meaningful life-cycle, more progressive taxes reduce the incentives for young agents to accumulate labor market experience and become high, and thus more highly taxed, earners in the first place. This effect lowers tax revenues from agents at all ages as younger households work less and older agents have lower wages in the presence of a more progressive tax

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6In his survey of the literature, Keane (2011) argues that labor supply choices both along the intensive and extensive margin, life-cycle considerations and human capital accumulation are crucial model elements when studying the impact of taxes on individual (and thus aggregate) labor supply.

7Biswa, Chakraborty, and Hai (2017) analyze empirically how this mechanism impacts regional economic development in the U.S.

8This is precisely what we find in our model for single women. See Section, 8.3 for details.

9The relationship between female LFP and human capital accumulation in life-cycle models is highlighted in Attanasio, Low, and Sanchez-Marcos (2008) and Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2012). Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2012) emphasize how a change from joint to separate taxation of married women would increase female LFP. This is consistent with the results in Section 8.3 where we find that married, who are taxed jointly with their husbands, and single women display opposite responses to changes in tax progressivity.
code. Thus the question of how the degree of tax progressivity impacts the tax level–tax revenue relationship (i.e. the Laffer curve) in life cycle models is a quantitative one, and the one we take up in this paper. ¹⁰

Departing from the analysis of Laffer curves in the representative agent paradigm by Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), two papers that computationally derive this curve in a heterogeneous household economy close to that studied by Aiyagari (1994) are Feve, Matheron, and Sahuc (forthcoming) and Ma and Tran (2016). In addition to important modeling differences, the focus in Feve, Matheron, and Sahuc (forthcoming) is on how the Laffer curve depends on outstanding government debt, whereas we are mainly concerned with the impact of the progressivity of the labor income tax code on the Laffer curve. The focus in Ma and Tran (2016) is on how an ageing population affects the Laffer curve. Finally, the closely related paper by Guner, Lopez-Daneri, and Ventura (2016) also studies the impact of tax progressivity on tax revenues. In addition to important differences in the modelling approach,¹¹ their paper focuses on a different question. Whereas we study the impact of tax progressivity on the whole Laffer curve (and, specifically, on its peak), their paper explores how higher tax progressivity affects tax revenues, holding the overall level of tax rates unchanged. They find limited scope for increasing revenues through increasing the progressivity of the tax system at current tax levels, a conclusion broadly consistent with our findings.

Turning to the broader related quantitative literature on tax revenue and tax reform, Chen and Imrohoroglu (2017) study the relationship between tax levels and the U.S. debt, whereas Kindermann and Krueger (2014) characterize the optimal top marginal tax rate in a model fairly similar to ours, but are not concerned with deriving Laffer curves for overall labor income tax revenue.¹² Relatedly, Badel and Huggett (2017) analytically characterize the revenue-maximizing top marginal tax rate in a broad class of dynamic economies, relating it to several sufficient statistics that include three easy-to-interpret elasticities. They are also not concerned with deriving Laffer curves for the overall labor income tax code, but rather focus on the impact of the maximal marginal tax rate, taking other features of the tax system as given.¹³ Badel, Huggett, and Luo (2017) use a life-cycle model where human capital accumulation is modeled as in Ben-Porath (1967) to study how much revenue can be raised by increasing taxes on the top earners in the economy.

¹⁰In an environment with labor market frictions, higher tax progressivity may also have the effect of reducing involuntary unemployment. An analysis of the effect of tax progressivity in an economy with labor market frictions is contained in Abraham, Doligalski, and Forstner (2017).

¹¹Their model does not include the extensive margin of labor supply and endogenous human capital accumulation—the features we find to be quantitatively crucial for capturing the relationship between tax progressivity and tax revenues.


¹³Lorenz and Sachs (2016) develop a sufficient statistics approach to testing whether the marginal tax rate is inefficiently high.
3. Measuring tax progressivity

Labor income taxes in the OECD are generally progressive and differ by household composition. To approximate country-specific tax functions, we use the labor income tax function proposed by Benabou (2002) and recently employed by Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2017) who argue that it fits the U.S. data well. Let \( y \) denote pre-tax (labor) income and \( y_a \) after tax income. The tax function \( T(y) \) is implicitly defined by the mapping between pre-tax and after-tax labor income \( y_a \):

\[
y_a = \theta_0 y^{1-\theta_1}
\]

so that \( T(y) = y - y_a \). We denote by \( T'(y) \) the marginal tax rate and by \( \tau(y) \) the average tax rate a household with income \( y \) pays. When we estimate the tax function and apply it in our model we express \( y \) relative to average labor earnings (AE) of employed individuals.

There are many ways to measure tax progressivity. Our objective is to employ a commonly used metric from the literature that, given the functional form of the tax function implied by (1), permits a one-dimensional measure of tax progressivity that is not confounded by the level of tax rates. In accordance with this goal we summarize the progressivity of the tax code by the progressivity tax wedge between two arbitrary income levels \( y_1 \) and \( y_2 > y_1 \):

\[
PW(y_1, y_2) = 1 - \frac{1 - T'(y_2)}{1 - T'(y_1)}.
\]

Such wedge based measures of progressivity are common in the literature, see Caucutt, Imrohoroglu, and Kumar (2003) and Guvenen, Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2014). As long as the tax code is weakly progressive and thus \( T'(y_2) \geq T'(y_1) \) this measure takes a value between 0 and 1. It is equal to zero for a proportional tax code for all income levels \( y_1 \) and \( y_2 \), approaches 1 as the marginal tax rate at the higher income \( y_2 \) approaches 1, and in general measures how strongly marginal tax rates increase between incomes \( y_1 \) and \( y_2 \). An attractive feature of the tax function we employ is that tax progressivity, as measured by the wedge \( PW(y_1, y_2) \) is determined exclusively by the parameter \( \theta_1 \), and is independent of the scale parameter \( \theta_0 \). As Section A.8 in the Appendix shows, the wedge is given, for all \( y_1 < y_2 \), by:

\[
PW(y_1, y_2) = 1 - \frac{1 - T'(y_2)}{1 - T'(y_1)} = 1 - \left( \frac{y_1}{y_2} \right)^{\theta_1}.
\]

Thus we can raise the level of taxes by decreasing the parameter \( \theta_0 \) without affecting tax progressivity (as measured by the wedge) at any level of incomes \( y_1 \) and \( y_2 \). At the same time, an increase in the progressivity parameter \( \theta_1 \) elevates the progressivity of the tax code, independent of the level of tax rates.

For the purpose of comparing tax progressivity across countries we now use labor income tax data from OECD countries to estimate the parameters \( \theta_0 \) and \( \theta_1 \) for different
Table 1. Tax progressivity in the OECD 2000–2007.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Progressivity Index</th>
<th>Relative Progressivity (U.S. = 1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>0.169</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0.187</td>
<td>1.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>1.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.201</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>1.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.221</td>
<td>1.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.226</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>0.237</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.258</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

family types (singles without children and married couples with zero, one and two children).\textsuperscript{15} We normalize earnings by average earnings of single individuals in each country, \(AE\), and estimate \(\tau(y/AE)\). Table S1 in the Appendix summarizes the results. To obtain an index of tax progressivity across countries, we then take the sum of the estimated \(\theta_1\)'s weighted by each family type's share of the population in the U.S.\textsuperscript{16} Table 1 displays the progressivity index for the U.S., Canada, Japan, and Western European countries.

We observe that there is considerable cross-country variation in tax progressivity in the OECD. As measured by the tax progressivity wedge Japan has the least progressive taxes, whereas the most progressive tax code can be found in Denmark. As measured by the index, taxes in Denmark are about 2.5 times more progressive than in Japan.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{15}When obtaining the data for married couples we assume a constant ratio between female and male income of 0.41 (the number found in the CPS). For married couples the OECD tax and benefit calculator takes the male and female gross income as separate inputs and returns the net income of the family after taxes and transfers. Thus it reflects, for each country, correctly whether spouses are taxed as singles or jointly. When we obtain the data we assume a constant ratio between female and male income. For countries with joint taxation this does not matter, but for countries with individual taxation it does. In the Appendix we reproduce the index under alternative assumptions about the ratio between male and female income.

\textsuperscript{16}We use U.S. population shares to avoid conflating cross-county differences in tax progressivity with cross-country differences in family structures.

\textsuperscript{17}In Section 8 we show that countries can raise more revenue and sustain higher debt with flatter taxes. This observation is consistent with the observation that Japan has the flattest taxes in the OECD as well as the highest debt-to-GDP ratio.
The U.S. is among the countries with the least progressive tax code.\footnote{The tax function in Equation 1 has also been estimated by \textit{Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante} (2017) and \textit{Guner, Lopez-Daneri, and Ventura} (2016) for the U.S. The OECD tax and benefit calculator, the source of our data, reports net income after taxes and includes most direct transfers to households. Like us, \textit{Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante} (2017) estimate the tax function net of transfers. They use tax data from the NBER TAXSIM in combination with the PSID to obtain data on taxes and transfers, and estimate $\theta^{US}_1 = 0.181$, slightly higher than our estimate of the progressivity parameter of $\theta^{US}_1 = 0.137$ from Table 1. The reason for the higher number in \textit{Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante} (2017) is likely that their data allows them to include a more complete measure of transfers. \textit{Guner, Lopez-Daneri, and Ventura} (2016), in contrast estimate the tax function on IRS income tax data which do not include transfers, and obtain a significantly smaller value of tax progressivity, $\theta^{US}_1 = 0.053$.} A crucial policy question we take up in this paper is how the ability of the U.S. government to generate revenue is affected if the U.S. had a tax code as progressive as the one in countries towards the bottom of Table 1.

4. **Building intuition: The impact of tax progressivity on labor supply and tax revenue**

In order to provide intuition for how tax progressivity impacts tax revenue in our quantitative model, and to establish a useful benchmark to compare our results against, we now study the Laffer curve in a sequence of simple, analytically tractable versions of our model, aiming at providing intuition for the main mechanisms at the core of our quantitative results.

4.1 **Tax progressivity, revenue and labor supply with representative agents**

Consider a representative household. This household has preferences over streams of consumption and hours \(\{c_t, h_t\}\) represented by lifetime utility function

\[
\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t, h_t) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left( \log(c_t) - \frac{h_t^{1+\eta}}{1+\eta} \right),
\]

where $\beta \in (0, 1)$, $\chi, \eta \geq 0$ are parameters. The household faces the budget constraints

\[
c_t + k_{t+1} = \theta_0 \left( \frac{w_t H_t}{w_t H_t} \right)^{1-\theta_1} + k_t (1 + r_t) + T_t,
\]

where $w_t, r_t$ are equilibrium wages and interest rates, $k_t$ are asset holdings of the household, $T_t$ is the transfer from the government, and $H_t$ is the “average or aggregate” hours worked, so that after tax labor income of the household, given the assumed tax function (1), equals $\theta_0 \left( \frac{w_t H_t}{w_t H_t} \right)^{1-\theta_1}$. In equilibrium, $H_t = h_t$. Government tax revenues are:

\[
TR_t = w_t H_t - \theta_0 \left( \frac{w_t H_t}{w_t H_t} \right)^{1-\theta_1} = w_t H_t - \theta_0.
\]

We assume that the government rebates a fraction $s \in [0, 1]$ of its tax revenues back to the agent in lump-sum fashion:

\[
T_t = s TR_t = s(\theta_0 H_t - \theta_0).
\]
First, taking factor prices and government transfers constant, the partial equilibrium effect on hours worked (and thus tax revenues) of increasing tax progressivity can be deduced from the first-order condition that characterizes the choice of hours worked along the intensive margin (in conjunction with the first order condition for consumption). In a broad class of models with a continuous choice of consumption and hours, this condition is as follows:

\[ u'_c(c, h)w \left( 1 - \left[ \tau(wh/wH) + \frac{wh}{wH} \tau'(wh/wH) \right] \right) = -u'_h(c, h), \]  

(8)

where \( \tau(\cdot) \) was defined above as the average tax rate.\(^{20}\)

If one increases tax progressivity \( \theta_1 \) and thus the slope of the average tax function \( \tau' \) but keeps the level \( \tau \) of taxes constant, this magnifies the “tax wedge” term in the square brackets, which (holding \( c \) and thus the income effect on labor supply unchanged) leads to a decrease in hours worked \( h \) and thus in labor income tax revenues.\(^{21}\) The next proposition states that this result carries over to the general equilibrium of the representative agent model in which private consumption as well as factor prices adjust.

Proposition 4.1. In the complete markets, representative agent model aggregate hours worked \( H \) and government tax revenues \( TR \) strictly decrease with tax progressivity\(^{22}\) \( \theta_1 \):

\[ \frac{\partial TR}{\partial \theta_1} < 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial H}{\partial \theta_1} < 0. \]  

(9)

Proof. See Appendix A.3.

4.2 Heterogeneity and tax progressivity: Labor supply along the intensive and extensive margin

The previous proposition demonstrates the negative impact of tax progressivity on aggregate labor supply and tax revenue in the representative agent model in which, by

\(^{19}\)One requirement to obtain this condition is that hours worked enter the budget constraint only through the \( wh(1 - \tau) \) term, which rules out the dynamic effects, such as the impact of hours worked on the future wages through the accumulation of the human capital. To derive equation (8), we also assumed that labor tax is a function of the income relative to the average earnings, \( \frac{wh}{wH} \).

\(^{20}\)Recall that \( \tau(y) = T(y) \) and thus \( \tau'(y) = \frac{T'(y) - \tau(y)}{y} \) and therefore \( T'(y) = \tau(y) + y\tau'(y) \).

\(^{21}\)In the general equilibrium of any representative agent model \( h_t = H_t \). Given the functional form of the tax function, we have \( \tau(wh/wH) = \tau(1) = 1 - \theta_0 \) whereas \( \tau'(wh/wH) = \tau'(1) = \theta_0 \theta_1 \) and thus one can hold the tax level, \( (1 - \theta_0) \), constant, but increase its progressivity, by raising the progressivity parameter \( \theta_1 \).

\(^{22}\)This result may seem to contrast with Proposition 6 in Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), who state that changing the tax progressivity does not change the Laffer curves in the representative agent model similar to ours. However, they perform a different thought experiment than this paper. When they change tax progressivity, they simultaneously recalibrate the model (by changing the disutility of hours worked, \( \chi \) in our utility specification) in order to keep \textit{hours worked unchanged} when tax progressivity changes. One can see from equation (S1) in the Appendix that \( \theta_1 \) affects hours through the \( \frac{1-\theta_0}{\theta_1} \) ratio. Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) adjust \( \chi \) to keep this ratio constant. Our focus, on the other hand, is precisely on the impact of tax progressivity on hours worked and the associated effect on tax revenue. Therefore we keep all \textit{parameters constant} when deriving Laffer curves for varying degrees of tax progressivity \( \theta_1 \).
construction, every household responds equally to a change in progressivity. However, with empirically plausible household heterogeneity in labor productivity and wages, the labor supply of households at the low and the high end of the income distribution will respond differentially, both along the intensive and the extensive margin. Our quantitative results in Section 8 will show the quantitative significance of this observation; here we develop the intuition for this finding in versions of the model with highly stylized degree of household heterogeneity.

First, turning to the intensive margin, consider a version of the representative agent model where each family is composed of an equal number of low-productivity members with permanent hourly productivity $w_L = \exp(-a)$ and high-productivity members with productivity $w_H = \exp(a)$ where $a > 0$ is a parameter. The family planner maximizes

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left( u(c_{L,t}, h_{L,t}) + u(c_{H,t}, h_{H,t}) \right)$$

subject to the family budget constraint

$$c_{L,t} + c_{H,t} + k_{t+1} = \theta_0 \left( \frac{we^{-a}h_{L,t}}{AE} \right)^{1-\theta_1} + \theta_0 \left( \frac{we^{a}h_{H,t}}{AE} \right)^{1-\theta_1} + k_t(1+r) + T$$

taking as given government transfers $T$, average earnings $AE$ in the economy and wages $w$ per efficiency units. We can show that hours worked of high-earnings members respond more strongly to an increase in tax progressivity than those of low-earnings members:

**Proposition 4.2.** Relative hours worked are given by $h_H / h_L = e^{2a(1-\theta_1) + \eta_1 + \eta}$ and thus

$$\frac{\partial (h_H / h_L)}{\partial \theta_1} < 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{\partial^2 (h_H / h_L)}{\partial \theta_1 \partial a} < 0$$

so that the relative hours worked are strictly decreasing in the degree of tax progressivity, the more so the bigger are the productivity differences.

**Proof.** See Appendix A.4.

Since an increase in the progressivity parameter increases the marginal tax rate of high-productivity and thus high-income household member more strongly than that of low-income earners (whose marginal tax rate might actually decline), hours worked of high-income members decline relative to those of low-income members of the family.

Now consider the extensive margin of labor supply, and for simplicity, abstract from the intensive margin and from capital accumulation (by assuming, for example, that
Consider a continuum of individuals that differ in their labor productivity realization $w_i$, and can only choose between zero and $\bar{h} > 0$ hours. Each individual solves

$$\max_{h \in [0, \bar{h}]} \log(c) - F \cdot \mathbb{1}_{[h > 0]}$$

subject to:

$$c = \theta_0 \left( \frac{w_i \bar{h}}{AE} \right)^{1-\theta_0} + T$$

again taking as given transfers $T$ and average earnings $AE$. The next proposition shows that an increase in tax progressivity encourages labor market participation (positive hours) at the low end of the productivity distribution but decreases tax revenues from those already working in that group, while it increases tax revenues from high income earners.

**Proposition 4.3.** Suppose there is a unique labor productivity threshold $w$ such that individuals with $w_i < w$ do not participate and those with $w_i \geq w$ participate in the labor market. Then a marginal increase in tax progressivity $\theta_1$ increases participation. Among the workers that choose to work positive hours, the marginal increase in tax progressivity $\theta_1$, ceteris paribus, increases tax revenues from those with labor income initially above average earnings $AE$ and reduces it from those below average earnings.

**Proof.** See Appendix A.5.

Taking together, both results in this subsection demonstrate that an increase in tax progressivity is bound to have a positive effect on the labor supply of the low earners, relative to the high earners, both along the intensive and the extensive margin. Departing from the basic results in this section, in the remainder of the paper we now explore the quantitative question, whether, and to what extent, tax progressivity impacts labor supply and aggregate tax revenues in a life cycle model with plausibly calibrated household heterogeneity and labor supply both along the intensive and extensive margin.

### 5. The model

In this section we describe the model we use to characterize the Laffer curve, and specifically discuss the model elements that sets our heterogeneous household economy apart from the representative agent model employed by Trabandt and Uhlig (2011).

#### 5.1 Technology

A representative firm operates a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form:

$$Y_t(K_t, L_t) = K_t^\alpha [Z_t L_t]^{1-\alpha},$$

where $K_t$ is capital input, $L_t$ is the labor input measured in efficiency units, and $Z_t$ is labor-augmenting productivity. The evolution of capital is described by:

$$K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta) K_t + I_t,$$
where $I_t$ is gross investment, and $\delta$ is the capital depreciation rate. We assume that productivity $Z_t$ grows deterministically at rate $\mu$, starting from $Z_0 = 1$, that is $Z_t = (1 + \mu)^t$.

In each period, the firm hires labor and capital to maximize its profit:

$$\Pi_t = Y_t - w_tL_t - (r_t + \delta)K_t,$$

and in a competitive equilibrium, factor prices equal their marginal products:

$$w_t = \frac{\partial Y_t}{\partial L_t} = (1 - \alpha)Z_t^{1-\alpha}\left(\frac{K_t}{L_t}\right)^\alpha = (1 - \alpha)Z_t\left(\frac{K_t/Z_t}{L_t}\right)^\alpha,$$  \hspace{1cm} (13)

$$r_t = \frac{\partial Y_t}{\partial K_t} - \delta = \alpha Z_t^{1-\alpha}\left(\frac{L_t}{K_t}\right)^{1-\alpha} - \delta = \alpha \left(\frac{L_t}{K_t/Z_t}\right)^{1-\alpha} - \delta/period,$$  \hspace{1cm} (14)

We restrict our analysis to balanced growth equilibria in which long-run growth is generated by exogenous technological progress. Following King, Plosser, and Rebelo (2002) and Trabandt and Uhlig (2011), we impose restrictions on the production technology, preferences, as well as government policies that allow us to transform the growing economy into a stationary one, using the usual transformations. Then, along a balanced growth path (BGP) $K_t/Z_t$ is constant. We define $w^*_t = w_t/Z_t$, and note that both $w^*_t$ and $r_t$ will also be constant along the BGP, and therefore we drop the time subscript for these variables as well.

5.2 Demographics

The economy is populated by $J$ overlapping generations of finitely lived households, with household age indexed by $j \in J$. We model heterogeneity in family structure explicitly since in the data family type is an important determinant of the income tax code, something we wish to capture in our model.\footnote{In his survey of the literature, Keane (2011) stresses the importance of marital status for the response of labor supply to taxes.} Households are either single (denoted by $S$) or married (denoted by $M$), and single households are further distinguished by their gender (man or woman), denoted as $\iota \in (m, w)$. Thus there are 3 types of households; single males, single females, and married couples. We assume that within a married household, the husband and the wife are of the same age. All households start life at age 20 and retire at age 65.

A model period is one year. The probability of dying while working is zero; retired households, on the other hand, face an age-dependent probability of dying, $\pi(j)$, and die for certain at model age $J = 81$, corresponding to a real world age of 100. By assumption a husband and a wife both die at the same age. We assume that the size of the population is fixed and normalize the size of each newborn cohort to 1. Using $\omega(j) = 1 - \pi(j)$ to denote the age-dependent survival probability, by the law of large numbers the mass of retired agents of age $j \geq 65$ still alive at any given period is equal to $\Omega_j = \prod_{q=j}^{q \geq 65} \omega(q)$. There are no annuity markets, so that a fraction of households leave unintended bequests which are redistributed in a lump-sum manner between the households that are currently alive. We use $I_t$ to denote the per-household bequest.
In addition to age and marital status, households are heterogeneous with respect to asset holdings, \( k \), exogenously determined permanent ability of its members, \( a \sim N(0, \sigma_a^2) \) drawn at birth, their years of labor market experience, \( e \), and idiosyncratic productivity shocks \( u \). By choosing a suitable utility function we assume that men always work positive hours during working age. However, a woman will either work or stay at home. Married households jointly decide on how many hours to work, how much to consume, and how much to save. Females who participate in the labor market accumulate one year of labor market experience. Since men always work, they accumulate an additional year of working experience in every period. Retired households make no labor supply decisions, but receive social security benefits \( \Psi_t \).

Since, as we will show below, labor supply decisions will vary greatly by family type and age it is important that the model has an empirically plausible distribution of family types by household age. The easiest way to achieve this is to introduce into the model marriage and divorce as exogenous shocks, as in Cubeddu and Rios-Rull (2003) and Chakraborty, Holter, and Stepanchuk (2015). Single households face an age-dependent probability, \( M(j) \), of becoming married whereas married households face an age-dependent probability, \( D(j) \), of divorce. There is assortative matching in the marriage market, so that there is a greater chance of marrying someone with similar ability, a fact that singles rationally foresee. Specifically, a single male with ability \( a^m \) faces a probability \( \phi^m(a | a^m; \varphi) \) of marrying a female of type \( a \), and symmetrically, a female of type \( a^w \) marries a male of ability \( a \) with probability \( \phi^w(a | a^w; \varphi) \). The parameter \( \varphi \), calibrated in Section 6, captures the degree of sorting in the marriage market, with \( \varphi = 0 \) standing in for perfectly random marriage and \( \varphi = 1 \) representing perfect sorting by permanent ability.\(^{25}\)

5.3 Wages

The wage of an individual depends on the aggregate wage per efficiency unit of labor, \( w^z = \frac{w}{Z} \), and the number of efficiency units the individual is endowed with. The latter depends on the individual's gender, \( \iota \in (m, w) \), ability, \( a \), accumulated labor market experience, \( e \), and an idiosyncratic shock, \( u \), which follows an AR(1) process. Thus, the wage of an individual with characteristics \((a, e, u, \iota)\) is given by:

\[
\log(w^z(a, e, u, \iota)) = \log(w^z) + a + \gamma_0 \iota + \gamma_1 e + \gamma_2 e^2 + \gamma_3 e^3 + u,
\]

\[
u' = \rho u + \epsilon, \quad \epsilon \sim N(0, \sigma_e^2).
\]

The parameters \( \gamma_0 \iota \) encode the gender wage gap, and \( \gamma_1, \gamma_2 \) as well as \( \gamma_3 \) capture returns to experience for women and the age profile of wages for men, respectively.

\(^{24}\)We thank two referees for pointing out to us that the degree of assortative matching interacts with tax progressivity since it leads to a more dispersed household income distribution, ceteris paribus.

\(^{25}\)Conditional on gender, age and permanent ability, a single household rationally expects to draw a partner from the conditional stationary distribution along all other single household characteristics of the other gender. For example, a single male understands that if he were, by chance, to marry a high ability female, she would carry higher than average assets into the marriage—since permanent ability and assets are positively correlated among single females.
5.4 Preferences

Married couples solve a joint maximization problem with equal weights on the spouses period utilities. Their momentary utility function, $U^M$, depends on joint consumption, $c$, hours worked by the husband, $n^m \in (0, 1]$, and the wife, $n^w \in [0, 1]$. It takes the following form:

$$U^M(c, n^m, n^w) = \log(c) - \frac{1}{2} \chi^m_{M} \frac{(n^m)^{1+\eta^m}}{1 + \eta^m} - \frac{1}{2} \chi^w_{M} \frac{(n^w)^{1+\eta^w}}{1 + \eta^w} - \frac{1}{2} r_{M} \cdot 1_{[n^w > 0]} + \log(G),$$

where $F^w_{M} \sim N(\mu_{F^w_{M}}, \sigma^2_{F^w_{M}})$ is a fixed disutility from working positive hours and $G$ is a public good supplied by the government. The indicator function, $1_{[n > 0]}$, is equal to 0 when $n = 0$ and equal to 1 when $n > 0$. The momentary utility function for singles is given by:

$$U^S(c, n, \iota) = \log(c) - \chi^\iota \frac{(n)^{1+\eta^\iota}}{1 + \eta^\iota} - F^\iota \cdot 1_{[n > 0]} + \log(G).$$

We allow the disutility of work to differ by gender and marital status, and the fixed cost of work for women to differ by marital status. The participation cost of a woman is drawn only once, at the beginning of life, and thus is a fixed characteristic of a woman (but is allowed to differ when single and when married). In a model without participation margin, King, Plosser, and Rebelo (2002) show that the above preferences are consistent with balanced growth. In the Appendix, we demonstrate that this is also true in our model with a fixed utility cost from working positive hours, and thus an operative extensive margin.

5.5 The government

The government runs a balanced social security system in which it taxes employees and the employer (the representative firm) at rates $\tau_{ss}$ and $\tilde{\tau}_{ss}$ and pays benefits, $\Psi_t$, to retirees. The government also taxes consumption, labor and capital income to finance the expenditures on pure public consumption goods, $G_t$, interest payments on the national debt, $rB_t$, lump sum redistributions, $g_t$, and unemployment benefits $T_t$. We assume that there is some outstanding government debt, and that the government debt to output ratio, $B_Y = B_t/Y_t$, is constant over time. Spending on public consumption is also assumed to be proportional to GDP so that $G_Y = G_t/Y_t$ is constant. Consumption and capital income are taxed at flat rates $\tau_c$ and $\tau_k$. In reality, taxation of capital is of course more complicated than in the model. In the U.S. interest income is taxed together with labor income and the corporate tax code is also non-linear. However, we follow the common practice in the macroeconomic literature to approximate the capital income tax schedule with a linear tax.

To model the non-linear labor income tax, as discussed in Section 2, we use the functional form in equation (1), proposed by Benabou (2002) and recently used in Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2017), that maps pre-tax (labor) income $y$ into after-tax

26The state space for both cost distributions is discretized using Tauchen’s (1986) method, and a woman’s position in the distribution of fixed costs remains the same throughout life.
income $y = \theta_0 y^{1-\theta_1}$, and where the parameters $\theta_0$ and $\theta_1$ govern the level and the progressivity of the tax system. In addition, the government collects social security contributions to finance the retirement benefits.

We denote with superscript Z aggregate variables deflated by the level of total factor productivity $Z$. That is, we define deflated tax revenue from labor, capital and consumption taxes $R^Z$, revenues from social security taxes $R^{ssz}$, deflated transfers $g^Z$, government consumption $G^Z$, social security benefits $\Psi^Z$, and unemployment benefits $T^Z$ as:

$$
R^Z = \frac{R_t}{Z_t}, \quad R^{ssz} = \frac{R_{ts}^s}{Z_t}, \quad g^Z = \frac{g_t}{Z_t}, \\
G^Z = \frac{G_t}{Z_t}, \quad \Psi^Z = \frac{\Psi_t}{Z_t}, \quad T^Z = \frac{T_t}{Z_t}.
$$

Along a BGP these variables remain constant (and also stay constant as a share of GDP). Denoting the fraction of women$^{27}$ that work 0 hours by $\zeta_t$, we can write the government budget constraints (normalized by the level of technology) along a BGP:

$$
g^Z \left(45 + \sum_{j \geq 65} \Omega_j \right) + \frac{45}{2} T^Z \zeta_t + G^Z + (r - \mu) B^Z = R^Z, \\
\Psi^Z \left(\sum_{j \geq 65} \Omega_j \right) = R^{ssz}.
$$

The second equation assures budget balance in the social security system by equating per capita benefits times the number of retired individuals to total tax revenues from social security taxes. The first equation is the regular government budget constraint on a BGP. The government spends resources on per capita transfers (times the number of individuals in the economy), on unemployment benefits for women that work zero hours, on government consumption and on servicing the interest on outstanding government debt, and has to finance these outlays through tax revenue.

5.6 Recursive formulation of the household problem

At any given time, a married household is characterized by its assets $k$, the man’s and the woman’s experience levels, $e^m$, $e^w$, their transitory productivity shocks, $u^m$, $u^w$, and permanent ability levels, $a^m$, $a^w$, the female fixed cost of working, $F^w_M$, as well as the households’ age $j$. Thus the list of state variables of a married household is $(k, e^w, u^m, u^w, a^m, a^w, F^w_M, j)$. Since we assumed that male experience is always equal to his age, $e^m = j$, we can therefore drop $e^m$ from the state space for married couples. The state space for a single household is $(k, e, u, a, F^w_S, \epsilon, j)$. To formulate the household problem along the BGP recursively, we define deflated household consumption and assets as $c^Z = c_t/Z_t$ and $k^Z = k_t/Z_t$. Since on the BGP the ratio of aggregate variables$^{28}$ to productivity $Z_t$ and to aggregate output remains constant, we posit that household-level variables, $c^Z$ and $k^Z$, do not depend on calendar time either along a BGP, and thus

$^{27}$Recall that we assume that men always work.

$^{28}$Including bequests $l^Z = l_t/Z_t$. 


we omit the time subscript for them as well. We can then formulate the optimization problem of a married household recursively as:

\[
V^M(k^z, e^w, u^m, u^w, a^m, a^w, F_{M}^w, j) = \max_{c^z, (k^z)'} \left[ U(c^z, n^m, n^w) \right. \\
+ \beta(1 - D(j)) E_{(u^m)', (u^w)'} \left[V^M((k^z)'', (e^w)'', (u^m)'', (u^w)'', a^m, a^w, F_{M}^w, j + 1) \right] \\
+ \left. \frac{1}{2} \beta D(j) E_{(u^m)', (u^w)'} \left[V^S((k^z)'', 2, u', a, m, j + 1) \right) \\
+ V^S((k^z)'', 2, (e^w)', u', a, w, F_{S}^w, j + 1) \right] \\
\text{s.t.:} \\
c^z(1 + \tau_c) + (k^z)'(1 + \mu) = \left\{ \begin{array} \{(k^z + \Gamma^z)(1 + r(1 - \tau_k)) + 2g^z + Y^L, & \text{if } j < 65, \\
(k^z + \Gamma^z)(1 + r(1 - \tau_k)) + 2g^z + 2\Psi^z, & \text{if } j \geq 65, \end{array} \right. \\
Y^L = (Y^{L,m} + Y^{L,w})(1 - \tau_{ss} - \tau_{I}S(Y^{L,m} + Y^{L,w})) + (1 - \mathbb{I}_{[n^w > 0]}(\tau^z)), \\
Y^{L,t} = \frac{n^w z^t(a', e', u')}{1 + \tau_{ss}}, \quad t = m, w, \\
(e^m)' = j + 1, \quad (e^w)' = e^w + \mathbb{I}_{[n^m > 0]}(\tau^z), \\
n^m \in (0, 1), \quad n^w \in [0, 1], \quad (k^z)' \geq 0, \quad c^z > 0, \\
n^t = 0 \quad \text{if } j \geq 65, \quad \tau = m, w.
\]

\(Y^L\) is household labor income, composed of labor income of the two spouses received during the working phase of their life, \(\tau_{ss}\) and \(\tau_{ss}\) are social security contributions paid by the employee and the employer. The problem of a single household (which includes the chances of marrying someone of opposite gender \(-\)l) can similarly be written:

\[
V^S(k^z, c, u, a, \tau, F_{S}^z, j) = \max_{c^z, (k^z)'} \left[ U(c^z, n) \right. \\
+ \beta(1 - M(j)) E_u \left[V^S((k^z)'', c', u', a, \tau, F_{S}^z, j + 1) \right] \\
+ \left. \beta M(j) E_{(u^m)', (u^w)'} \left[V^M((k^z)'', (e^w)'', (u^m)'', (u^w)'', a^m, a^w, j + 1) \right) \\
+ (k^z)'', (e^w)'', (u^m)'', (u^w)'', a^m, a^w, j + 1) \right] \\
\text{s.t.:} \\
c^z(1 + \tau_c) + (k^z)'(1 + \mu) = \left\{ \begin{array} \{(k^z + \Gamma^z)(1 + r(1 - \tau_k)) + g^z + Y^L, & \text{if } j < 65, \\
(k^z + \Gamma^z)(1 + r(1 - \tau_k)) + g^z + \Psi^z, & \text{if } j \geq 65, \end{array} \right. \\
Y^L = (Y^{L,t})(1 - \tau_{ss} - \tau_{I}S(Y^{L,t})) + (1 - \mathbb{I}_{[n^w > 0]}(\tau^z)), \\
\]

where...
\[ y_{L,t} = n^t w^{r,t}(a^t, e^t, u^t) \frac{1}{1 + \tau_{ss}}, \quad i = m, w, \]

\[
\begin{align*}
(e^m)' &= e^m + 1, \\
(e^w)' &= e^w + 1_{[u^w > 0]},
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
n^m &\in (0, 1], \\
n^w &\in [0, 1], \\
(k^2)' &\geq 0, \\
c^2 &> 0,
\end{align*}
\]

\[ n^t = 0 \quad \text{if} \quad j \geq 65, \quad i = m, w. \]

The fixed cost of working, \( F^c \), is assumed to be zero for men, and thus men optimally choose positive work hours. \( E(k^{-}e^{-}, a^{-}, u^{-}, y^{-}, F^{-}, y^{-}) \) is the expectation about the characteristics of a partner in the case of marriage in addition to the expectation about next period’s labor productivity of the individual. The expectation is taken conditional on the individual’s age and permanent ability, because there is perfect assortative matching with respect to age, and to some (calibrated) extent with respect to permanent ability.

### 5.7 Recursive competitive equilibrium

We call a recursive competitive equilibrium of the growth-adjusted economy a stationary equilibrium.\(^{29}\) In equilibrium agents optimize, given prices, markets clear, budgets balance, and the cross-sectional distribution across household types is stationary. For sake of brevity, the formal equilibrium definition is stated in Appendix A.1.

### 6. Calibration

This section describes the calibration of the model parameters. We calibrate our model to match selected moments from 2001–2007 U.S. data. We choose this time frame since the tax data start in 2001, and since we want to avoid the great recession starting in 2008 for our steady state analysis. Many parameters can be calibrated directly to their empirical counterparts, without solving the model. These are listed (including their values) in Table 2. In contrast, the 11 parameters in Table 3 below are estimated using an exactly identified simulated method of moments (SMM) approach.

#### 6.1 Technology

We set the capital share parameter \( \alpha \) to \( 1/3 \) and choose the depreciation rate to match an investment-to-capital ratio of 9.88% in U.S. data.

#### 6.2 Demographics and transition between family types

The demographic structure of the model is completely determined by the unit mass of newborn households and the death probabilities of retirees. We obtain the latter from the National Center for Health Statistics.\(^{29}\) The associated BGP can of course be constructed by scaling all growing variables by the factor \( Z_t \).
Table 2. Parameters calibrated outside of the model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$1/\eta^m$, $1/\eta^w$</td>
<td>0.4, 0.8</td>
<td>$U^m(c, n^m, n^w) = \log(c) - \frac{x^m_{\eta^m}}{1+x^m_{\eta^m}} - \frac{x^w_{\eta^w}}{1+x^w_{\eta^w}} - F^w_{\eta^w} \cdot 1_{[\mu^w &gt; 0]}$</td>
<td>Literature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma^m_i, \gamma^m_j, \gamma^m_k$</td>
<td>0.109, $-1.47 \times 10^{-3}$, $6.34 \times 10^{-5}$</td>
<td>$w_t(a_t, e_t, u_t) = w_t e^{\delta c_t + \gamma^m_i c_t^2 + \gamma^m_j c_t^3 + \gamma^m_k c_t^4}$</td>
<td>PSID (1968–1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma^w_i, \gamma^w_j, \gamma^w_k$</td>
<td>0.078, $-2.56 \times 10^{-3}$, $2.56 \times 10^{-5}$</td>
<td>$w_t(a_t, e_t, u_t) = w_t e^{\delta c_t + \gamma^w_i c_t^2 + \gamma^w_j c_t^3 + \gamma^w_k c_t^4}$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma^m_i, \sigma^m_j, \sigma^m_k$</td>
<td>0.319, 0.310, 0.396, 0.339</td>
<td>$\epsilon \sim N(0, \sigma^m_i)$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho^m_i, \rho^m_j, \rho^m_k$</td>
<td>0.338, 0.385</td>
<td>$\epsilon \sim N(0, \sigma^m_i)$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta^m_0, \theta^m_1, \theta^M_0, \theta^M_1$</td>
<td>0.8177, 0.1106, 0.9420, 0.1577</td>
<td>$\gamma = \theta_0 y^{1-\theta_1}$</td>
<td>OECD tax data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau_k$</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>Capital tax</td>
<td>Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau_{SS}, \tau_{SS}$</td>
<td>(0.0765, 0.0765)</td>
<td>Social Security tax</td>
<td>OECD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\tau_C$</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>Consumption tax</td>
<td>Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$T$</td>
<td>0.2018 - $AW$</td>
<td>Income if not working</td>
<td>CEX 2001–2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$G/Y$</td>
<td>0.0725</td>
<td>Pure public consumption goods</td>
<td>2 × military spending (World Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$B/Y$</td>
<td>0.6185</td>
<td>National debt</td>
<td>Government debt (World Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\omega(j)$</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Survival probabilities</td>
<td>NCHS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M(j), D(j)$</td>
<td>Varies</td>
<td>Marriage and divorce probabilities</td>
<td>CPS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$k_0$</td>
<td>0.4409 - $AW$</td>
<td>Savings at age 20</td>
<td>NLSY97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu$</td>
<td>0.0200</td>
<td>Output growth rate</td>
<td>Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta$</td>
<td>0.0788</td>
<td>Depreciation rate</td>
<td>$I/K - \mu$ (BEA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>1/3</td>
<td>$Y_t(K_t, L_t) = K_t^{\alpha} \cdot L_t^{1-\alpha}$</td>
<td>Historical capital share</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. Parameters calibrated endogenously.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Moment</th>
<th>Moment Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma_0^m$</td>
<td>-1.207</td>
<td>$w_1(\alpha, \epsilon, u_i) = w_1 e^{\gamma_0^m + \gamma_1^m + \gamma_2^m + \gamma_3^m + \gamma_4^m + \gamma_5^m + \gamma_6^m + \epsilon}$</td>
<td>Gender earnings ratio</td>
<td>1.569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>1.009</td>
<td>Discount factor</td>
<td>K/Y</td>
<td>2.640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_{F^w_M}$</td>
<td>-0.047</td>
<td>$F^w_M \sim N(\mu_{F^w_M}, \sigma_{F^w_M}^2)$</td>
<td>Married female employment</td>
<td>0.676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_{F^w_M}$</td>
<td>0.183</td>
<td></td>
<td>$R^2$ from $\xi_{[n&gt;0]} = \rho_0 + \rho_1 \xi_{[n-1&gt;0]}$</td>
<td>0.553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^m_M$</td>
<td>4.080</td>
<td>$U_M(c, n^m, n^w) = \log(c) - \chi^m_M (\frac{\alpha^m c^{1+n^m}}{1+\alpha^m c^{1+n^m}} - \frac{\alpha^w c^{1+n^w}}{1+\alpha^w c^{1+n^w}} - F^w_M \cdot \xi_{[n^w&gt;0]}$</td>
<td>Married female hours</td>
<td>0.224 (1225 h/year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21.000</td>
<td>Married male hours</td>
<td>0.360 (1965 h/year)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_{F^w_S}$</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
<td>$F^w_S \sim N(\mu_{F^w_S}, \sigma_{F^w_S}^2)$</td>
<td>Single female employment</td>
<td>0.760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_{F^w_S}$</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td></td>
<td>$R^2$ from $\xi_{[n&gt;0]} = \rho_0 + \rho_1 \xi_{[n-1&gt;0]}$</td>
<td>0.463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^S_S$</td>
<td>8.945</td>
<td>$U^S(c, n, \epsilon) = \log(c) - \chi^S_S (\frac{\alpha^m c^{1+n^m}}{1+\alpha^m c^{1+n^m}} - F^w_M \cdot \xi_{[n&gt;0]}$</td>
<td>Single female hours</td>
<td>0.251 (1371 h/year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^S_S$</td>
<td>60.800</td>
<td>Single male hours</td>
<td>0.282 (1533 h/year)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\varphi$</td>
<td>0.467</td>
<td>$M_n = (1 - \varphi) n + \varphi a$</td>
<td>$\text{corr}(w^m, w^w)$</td>
<td>0.407</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We assume that there are three family types: (1) single males; (2) single females; (3) married couples. To calculate age-dependent probabilities of transitions between married and single, we use U.S. data from the CPS March supplement, covering years 1999 to 2001. We assume stationarity, that is, although we permit the probabilities of transitioning between the family types to depend on an individual’s age, we rule out dependence on her birth cohort. Denoting the shares of married and divorced individuals at age \( j \) by \( \bar{M}(j) \) and \( \bar{D}(j) \), we compute the probability of getting married at age \( j \), \( M(j) \), and the probability of getting divorced, \( D(j) \), from the following transition equations:

\[
\bar{M}(j+1) = (1 - \bar{M}(j))M(j) + \bar{M}(j)(1 - D(j)),
\]

\[
\bar{D}(j+1) = \bar{D}(j)(1 - M(j)) + \bar{M}(j)D(j).
\]

Upon marriage, the exogenous degree of spousal sorting by ability is governed by the parameter \( \phi \), and estimated within the SMM procedure so that the model matches the empirical correlation of hourly wages of 0.407 in the CPS (2001–2007) for married couples.\(^{30}\)

### 6.3 Wages

We estimate the exogenous age profile for male wages, the experience profile for female wages, and the exogenous processes for the idiosyncratic shocks using the PSID from 1968–1997. After 1997, it is not possible to obtain years of actual labor market experience from the PSID. Appendix A.9 describes the estimation procedure in more detail.

We use a 2-step approach to control for selection into the labor market, as described in Heckman (1976) and Heckman (1979). After estimating the returns to age for males and to experience for females, we use the residuals from the regressions and the panel data structure of the PSID to estimate the parameters for the productivity shock processes, \( \rho_\varepsilon \) and \( \sigma_\varepsilon \), and the variance of individual ability, \( \sigma_\alpha \). We normalize the mean female wage parameter \( \gamma^w_0 \) to 1 and estimate the mean male wage parameter \( \gamma^m_0 \) internally in the model.\(^{31}\) The associated data moment is the ratio between male and female earnings.

### 6.4 Preferences

The period utility functions for both family types are given in equations (17) and (18). The discount factor, \( \beta \), the cross-sectional means and variances of the fixed costs of

\(^{30}\)Specifically, prior to marriage an individual of earnings type \( a \) draws random marriage quality \( \varsigma \sim U[0, 1] \). His/her marriage quality rank \( M_n \) is then determined by

\[
M_n = (1 - \varphi)\varsigma + \varphi a.
\]

Then all individuals of the same gender are ranked according to \( M_n \) and matched with exactly the same rank of the opposite gender. If \( \varphi = 0 \), marriage is random, and if \( \varphi = 1 \), marriages are perfectly sorted by spousal ability \( a \). Appendix A.10 contains the details of this construction, which, conditional on own ability \( a \), induces a distribution over spousal abilities (and associated distribution over the other payoff-relevant state variables of future partners) that permits singles to rationally form expectations.

\(^{31}\)The value of \( \gamma^m_0 \) does not reflect the difference between the wages of 20-year old men and women because the age profile for men starts at 20 years, whereas the experience profile for women starts at 0 years.
working, \(\mu_{FwM}\), \(\mu_{FS}\), \(\sigma_{FwM}^2\), and \(\sigma_{FS}^2\), and the disutility parameters of working more hours, \(\chi_{mM}\), \(\chi_{wM}\), \(\chi_{mS}\), and \(\chi_{wS}\), are parameters estimated through the SMM approach. The empirical moment that mainly identifies the time discount factor \(\beta\) is the capital-output ratio \(K/Y\), taken from the BEA. The mean participation costs for women, \(\mu_{FwM}\), \(\mu_{FS}\), are identified by the employment rates of married and single females aged 20–64, taken from the CPS. To pin down the cross-sectional variance of the participation costs, \(\sigma_{FwM}^2\) and \(\sigma_{FS}^2\), we use the persistence of labor force participation of married and single females (again aged 20–64) from the PSID. If the cross-sectional dispersion of the participation cost is high, some women will work all the time, and some women will always be out of the labor force. We regress this year's participation status on last year's participation status in the data and obtain an \(R^2\) for single and married women. We then use the \(R^2\)s as moments. The parameters governing the disutility of working more hours, \(\chi_{mM}\), \(\chi_{wM}\), \(\chi_{mS}\), and \(\chi_{wS}\), are identified by hours worked per person aged 20–64 by marital status and gender, again taken from the CPS.

There is considerable debate in the economic literature about the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, see Keane (2011) for a thorough survey. However, there seems to be consensus that female labor supply is much more elastic than male labor supply.\(^{32}\) We set \(1/\eta_{m} = 0.4\), in line with the contemporary literature in quantitative macroeconomics, see for instance Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2012). \(1/\eta_{w}\) we set to 0.8. Note that \(1/\eta_{w}\) is here to be interpreted as the intensive margin Frisch elasticity of female labor supply, while \(1/\eta_{m}\) is the Frisch elasticity of male labor supply. The \(1/\eta\) parameter cannot be interpreted as the macro elasticity of labor supply with respect to tax rates, see Keane and Rogerson (2012) for a detailed discussion.

6.5 Taxes and social security

As described in Section 3 we employ the labor income tax function in equation (1), as proposed by Benabou (2002). We use U.S. labor income tax data provided by the OECD to estimate the parameters \(\theta_0\) and \(\theta_1\) for different family types.\(^{33}\)

For future reference, the left panel of Figure 1 shows the average tax rate function we obtain for U.S. singles (dashed line), plotted against labor earnings relative to average earnings, \(AE\). It also contains the tax functions as we multiply \(\theta_1\) by 0 (converting it to a flat tax) or by two (roughly the progressivity of the Danish tax system); these two functions are used in counterfactual analyses below. The right panel plots the tax wedge \(\tau(wh/\bar{w}H) + \frac{wh}{\bar{w}H} \tau'(wh/\bar{w}H)\) against labor earnings.

As can be seen from the left panel of Figure 1, making taxes more progressive increases the average tax rate for those with above average earnings and decreases it for those with below average earnings. A more progressive tax system would thus create a positive income effect on the labor supply of agents with above average earnings and a negative income effect on the labor supply of agents with below average earnings. The

\(^{32}\)The recent paper by Blundell, Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten (2016) estimates the intensive margin Frisch elasticity for men and women between the ages of 30 and 57 as 0.53 and 0.85, respectively.

\(^{33}\)Table S1 in the Appendix summarizes our findings for the U.S., but also for other countries. Table S3 displays the share of labor income taxes paid by different income deciles in our U.S. benchmark economy.
right panel shows that, increasing tax progressivity increases the distorting tax wedge, and thus induces a negative substitution effect on the work hours, of all but the lowest wage earners. Workers with wages below 30% of average earnings instead experience a smaller tax wedge and a positive substitution effect from an increase in tax progressivity.

For the government-run social security system we assume that payroll taxes for the employee, $\tau_{ss}$, and the employer, $\tilde{\tau}_{ss}$ are flat taxes, and use the rate from the bracket covering most incomes in the U.S., 7.65% for both $\tau_{ss}$ and $\tilde{\tau}_{ss}$. Finally, we follow Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) and set $\tau_k = 36\%$ and $\tau_c = 5\%$ for consumption and capital income tax rates.

### 6.6 Transfers and government consumption

People who do not work have other source of income such as unemployment benefits, social aid, black market work etc. They also have more time for home production. Pinning down the consumption equivalent of income when not working therefore is a difficult task, and the number we choose will impact the calibrated fixed costs of working, chosen to match the employment rate for women by marital status. To approximate the income when not working, we take the average value of non-housing consumption of households with income less than $5000$ per year from the Consumer Expenditure Survey.\(^3\)

To determine pure public consumption $G$ we follow Prescott (2004) and assume that government expenditure on pure public consumption goods is equal to two times expenditure on national defense. In addition the government must pay interest on the national debt before the remaining tax revenues can be redistributed lump sum to households.

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\(^3\)When we perform policy experiments we keep the fraction of income of those not working to those working constant.
6.7 Estimation method

Eleven model parameters are estimated using an exactly identified simulated method of moments approach. We minimize the squared percentage deviation between simulated model statistics and the eleven data moments in column 5 of Table 3. Let \( \Theta = \{ \gamma_m^0, \beta, \mu_w^M, \sigma_w^M, \lambda_M, \mu_S, \sigma_S, \lambda_S, \varphi \} \), and let \( V(\Theta) = (V_1(\Theta), \ldots, V_{11}(\Theta))^\prime \) with \( V_i(\Theta) = (\bar{m}_i - \hat{m}_i(\Theta))/\bar{m}_i \) measuring the percentage difference between empirical and simulated moments. Then \( \Theta \) is chosen to minimize \( V(\Theta)^\prime V(\Theta) \). Table 3 summarizes the estimated parameter values and the data moments. Since we match all moments exactly, \( V(\Theta)^\prime V(\Theta) = 0 \).

7. Model performance

To verify that our benchmark model is a reasonable model of the U.S. economy, in this subsection we display the model performance along a number of dimensions not targeted by the calibration. In Figure 2 we plot the life-cycle profiles of labor income for working men\(^{35} \) and all women in the CPS 2001–2007, together with the corresponding profiles from the model. Figure 3 contains the life-cycle profile of assets from the PSID 2001–2007, and from the model economy. The model captures well the qualitative features of the data, and is successful in matching, quantitatively, the increase in earnings and assets of households over the life cycle in the data.\(^{36} \)

In our model, one key margin of adjustment to the progressivity of the tax code is female participation in the labor market. It is therefore important that the model captures well the heterogeneous participation decision of females with different characteristics. In the model households are born with different abilities and thus earnings capacities \( a \). If we interpret \( a \) to stand in for (unmodeled) differences in education levels acquired

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\(^{35}\)Our model only has working males.

\(^{36}\)Our model has not been calibrated to match average asset holdings in the PSID, but to match the capital-output ratio from BEA data. Households in the PSID, on average, hold slightly more assets than what is implied by this calibration target.
prior to labor market entry when our life cycle model starts, we can ask whether the model captures well labor market participation rates of females with different educational attainment.

To do so, we group women into five education groups, and in Figure 4 we plot female labor force participation for each of these groups, both in the CPS for 2001–2007, as well as in our model. We observe that both in the model and data labor force participation increases with educational attainment, although the gradient is somewhat steeper in the model than in the data.

Overall, we conclude that qualitatively, and for the most part quantitatively, the model is consistent with the most salient cross-sectional facts from U.S. micro data. We therefore now employ it as an empirically informed cross-sectionally rich laboratory to

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37 Level 1 stands for less than high school, 2 for high school graduates, 3 for some college, 4 for college graduates and 5 for professional or graduate degrees.
deduce how government tax revenue depends on the progressivity of the income tax code.

8. The impact of tax progressivity and household heterogeneity on the Laffer curve

In this section we display the main quantitative results of our paper, to make the points that (a) the progressivity of the tax code is a key determinant of the shape of the Laffer curve, and that (b) the precise form of household heterogeneity present in the model is crucial for the quantitative magnitude of this impact of tax progressivity on the Laffer curve. To do so, the analysis will proceed in three steps:

1. For fixed tax progressivity, defined by the parameter $\theta_1$, we derive the Laffer curve by scaling up the tax level by adjusting $\theta_0$ for both married and singles by the same constant and plotting BGP tax revenue against the level of taxes. In Section 8.1 we study the impact of tax progressivity for the Laffer curve by tracing out Laffer curves for different degrees of progressivity, as measured by $\theta_1$. We do so under the assumption that the increase in revenue is redistributed lump-sum to households, and call the resulting Laffer curves g-curves, following Trabandt and Uhlig’s (2011) terminology.\textsuperscript{38}

2. Section 8.2 derives Laffer curves under two alternative assumptions about the use of the additional tax revenue. First, we assume that additional revenue is used to service a larger stock of outstanding government debt (b-Laffer curves).\textsuperscript{39} This exercise also characterizes the maximal sustainable government debt. Second, additional revenue is used for wasteful government spending (s-Laffer curves). The reduction of lump-sum transfers relative to the benchmark will reduce the negative income effect on labor supply, and thus lead to a larger increase in revenues when raising tax levels.\textsuperscript{40}

3. Finally, we study how the interaction between household heterogeneity and tax progressivity impacts the Laffer curve. In Section 8.3, we first investigate, holding tax progressivity $\theta_1$ fixed, what forms of household heterogeneity impact Laffer curves the most in a quantitative sense. In a second step, in Section 8.3.2 we display how maximal tax revenue depends on the progressivity of the tax code in a selection of models that differ in their degree of household heterogeneity.

8.1 The impact of tax progressivity

In this section we characterize U.S. Laffer curves under the assumption that additional tax revenue is redistributed uniformly to all households (the g-curve). In Figure 5, we

\textsuperscript{38}Note that our g-curves are the analogue of s-curves in Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) because they denote the lump-sum transfer by s and we denote it by g.

\textsuperscript{39}Note that in the representative agent setting, g- and b-Laffer curves coincide (see Feve, Matheron, and Sahuc (forthcoming)), whereas in a model with heterogeneous agents and incomplete asset markets, they differ.

\textsuperscript{40}For the b-curves, in addition, an increase in public debt crowds out physical capital, raising the equilibrium interest rate and lowering the equilibrium wages, thereby reducing the labor income tax base, and leading to a smaller increase in tax revenues when increasing the tax level. Furthermore, the extra debt is owned by households, increasing their asset income and the associated capital income taxes, which in turn leads to a larger increase in tax revenues when increasing the labor income tax level.
Figure 5. Impact of tax progressivity on the Laffer curve (holding debt to GDP constant).

plot Laffer curves (tax revenue plotted against the average tax rate, which we adjust through multiplying $\theta_0$ by a constant) for varying degrees of progressivity (multiplying $\theta_1$ for all family types by the same constant). Recall that an increase in $\theta_1$ increases the progressivity wedge defined in equation (2) for all income levels. The current U.S. benchmark tax system corresponds to the diamond ($\bar{\tau}(y) \approx 17\%$, with tax revenue of 100% relative to the benchmark) on the black solid line displaying the Laffer curve associated with current U.S. tax progressivity. We observe that, according to our results, the U.S. is currently still relatively far from the peak of its Laffer curve. Under current progressivity, tax revenues can be increased by about 59% if the average tax rate on labor income is raised from 17% today to approximately 58%, the peak of the Laffer curve41.

The main observation we wish to highlight from Figure 5 is that the progressivity of the tax system has considerable impact on the Laffer curve. The maximal revenue that can be raised with a flat tax system is about 7% higher than peak revenue under current U.S. progressivity, and about 15% higher than with a tax system twice as progressive as in the U.S., very similar to the tax system in Denmark.42

Figure 5 also allows us to assess how important tax progressivity is relative to the tax level in achieving the maximum labor income tax revenues. Let $TR_{\text{cur}}$ be the tax revenues under current labor income tax in the U.S. (the grey diamond in the figure), $TR_{\text{lev}}$ be the maximum tax revenues that can be attained by changing the tax level at current U.S. progressivity (the peak of the “1 $\times$ US prog.” curve), and finally let $TR_{\text{flat}}$ be the maximum tax revenues one can achieve with flat taxes (the peak of the “Flat tax” curve in the figure). Then the total maximum change in tax revenues is $\Delta_{\text{tot}} = TR_{\text{flat}} - TR_{\text{cur}} = (1.59 \cdot 1.07 - 1)TR_{\text{cur}}$, while the change due to abolishing tax progressivity is $\Delta_{\text{prog}} = TR_{\text{flat}} - TR_{\text{level}} = (1.59 \cdot 1.07 - 1.59)TR_{\text{cur}}$. Thus changing tax progressivity can account for up to $\Delta_{\text{prog}}/\Delta_{\text{tot}} = 15.9\%$ of all additional tax revenues that can be

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41 Figure S4 in the Appendix provides a breakdown of revenue from labor, consumption and capital income taxes, and Figures 7 and S3 display how different labor market statistics vary with the level of taxes.

42 Note that the Danish tax system is generally more progressive than the U.S. tax system, however, as we scale the progressivity of the U.S. system we never precisely obtain the Danish system since the U.S. and Danish systems also differ in the relative tax burdens of different family types.
Table 4. The impact of progressivity on revenue at different tax rates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prog. = $X \theta_{US}$</th>
<th>$\bar{\tau}(y) = 17.3%$</th>
<th>$\bar{\tau}(y) = 25%$</th>
<th>$\bar{\tau}(y) = 35%$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>105.1</td>
<td>124.8</td>
<td>145.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>118.5</td>
<td>137.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>110.3</td>
<td>127.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>99.7</td>
<td>115.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table shows how progressivity affects revenue at different tax rates. It measures how much revenue is raised relative to the calibrated benchmark model (second row, second column).

Table 5. The impact of tax progressivity on international Laffer curves.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Progressivity Index</th>
<th>Relative Progressivity (U.S. = 1)</th>
<th>Max Revenue (% of benchmark)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>163.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>159.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>159.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.142</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>159.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>159.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>155.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>154.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>0.200</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>153.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0.221</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>152.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>0.258</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>147.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table shows how tax progressivity affects the maximum revenue that can be raised in selected countries. The second column displays the progressivity index that we estimated in Section 3. The third column shows progressivity relative to the U.S. The third column shows the maximum revenue that can be raised if the U.S. adopted a tax code with progressivity similar to column two.

generated by changing the current U.S. labor income system to the revenue-maximizing one.\textsuperscript{43}

Tax progressivity does not only impact maximally obtainable government revenue, but revenue at all levels of tax rates. Table 4 displays revenue at different average tax rates (including the benchmark level of 17.3%), relative to revenue that can be raised with the current U.S. progressivity of the tax system. Consistent with Figure 5, the table shows that the increase in tax revenues induced by higher average tax rates slows down with higher tax progressivity. At current U.S. progressivity doubling the level of average tax rates from the benchmark of 17.3% to 35% raises revenue by 37.6 percentage points; the same experiment increases revenues by 40.4 percentage points under a flat tax system (first row of the table), but only by 32 percentage points if taxes are three times as progressive as in the U.S.

To give these numbers empirical content, Table 5 shows how cross-country differences in actual tax progressivity affect maximal revenue, for a selected sample of countries. In our sample of selected OECD economies, Japan has the least progressive tax

\textsuperscript{43}Under the restriction that the tax system remains in the class of tax functions considered in this paper and that we do not consider regressive taxes.
system, 0.74 times as progressive as the U.S. on our progressivity index, and Denmark has the most progressive tax system, 1.88 times more progressive than the U.S. With progressivity similar to Japan, the U.S. could increase revenue by a maximum 63%, relative to the calibrated benchmark. With Denmark’s progressivity, the feasible increase in revenue is only 45%, relative to the current U.S. benchmark.

What causes the decline in tax revenues as the tax schedule becomes more progressive? Table 6 displays different model statistics for three different levels of progressivity. The table indicates that, for a given tax level, a more progressive tax schedule leads to lower aggregate labor supply and savings, and consequently, lower revenues.

We note especially that the progressivity of the tax system strongly impacts female labor force participation, and that this impact differs fundamentally for married and for single women, in turn justifying why we model heterogeneity in family structure explicitly in this paper. Women are often low earners and for single women a more progressive tax system increases the benefits from work. This illustrates the potential positive effect of higher progressivity on the labor force participation of low-earners. In contrast, married women are taxed jointly with their husbands, and if the male member of the household has high wages, the additional benefits from the wife participating in the labor force are smaller with a more progressive tax system. For example, at the current U.S. average level of taxes (17.3%), reverting to a flat tax increases the labor force participation rate of married females by 7%, but lowers it for single females by 13%. Reversely, applying Denmark’s higher tax progressivity to the U.S., labor force participation of married females would fall by 8%, whereas single females would participate in the labor market at a 12% higher rate. This result applies to all tax levels along the Laffer curve, and is an important driver of the impact of tax progressivity on tax revenue.

### 8.2 Alternative uses of tax revenue

Thus far, we have derived Laffer curves under the assumption that the government lump-sum rebates the extra revenue back to private households, thereby generating an income effect on labor supply (so-called g-curves). In this section we document that our results concerning the impact of tax progressivity on the Laffer curve does not hinge on this assumption. Specifically, Figure S5 in the Appendix displays b-Laffer curves in which the additional revenue brought about by an increase in the tax level \( \theta_0 \) is used to service interest payments on additional government debt (left panel), and the associated maximally sustainable government debt (right panel). Table 7, middle panel (b-curves), summarizes the key results.

Using extra tax revenue for interest payments on additional government debt results in a higher peak of the Laffer curve, relative to lump-sum rebates, since i) the latter reduce labor supply though an income effect, which is absent if extra tax receipts flow into

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44We vary \( \theta_0 \) such that each economy has the same average tax rate, and display results of average rates of 17.3% (the benchmark tax level), 25% and 35%.

45In Appendix A.2 we argue, given our utility function, that as long as households have some non-labor income (either through assets or government transfers), then there exists a Laffer curve in that tax revenue initially rises, but eventually falls as average tax rates increase.
Table 6. Selected statistics for different tax progressivity, at average tax rates of 17.3%, 25% and 35%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>( \bar{\tau}(y) = 17.3% )</th>
<th></th>
<th>( \bar{\tau}(y) = 25% )</th>
<th></th>
<th>( \bar{\tau}(y) = 35% )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flat tax</td>
<td>US Prog.</td>
<td>2 × US Prog.</td>
<td>Flat Tax</td>
<td>US Prog.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tax Revenue</td>
<td>105.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>124.8</td>
<td>118.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Supply</td>
<td>103.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>94.0</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>94.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male Labor Supply</td>
<td>103.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>95.7</td>
<td>101.2</td>
<td>97.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Male Labor Supply</td>
<td>102.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>97.1</td>
<td>99.3</td>
<td>97.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married Male Labor Supply</td>
<td>104.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>102.1</td>
<td>98.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Labor Supply</td>
<td>104.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>91.6</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>88.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Female Labor Supply</td>
<td>90.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>107.1</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>86.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married Female Labor Supply</td>
<td>114.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>103.1</td>
<td>89.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female LFP</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>99.5</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>92.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Female LFP</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>112.0</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>90.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married Female LFP</td>
<td>104.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>93.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Intensive Margin</td>
<td>107.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>92.1</td>
<td>103.2</td>
<td>96.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Female Intensive Margin</td>
<td>103.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>95.7</td>
<td>98.6</td>
<td>95.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married Female Intensive Margin</td>
<td>109.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>89.1</td>
<td>105.7</td>
<td>96.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savings</td>
<td>107.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>91.7</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>92.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Column 3 is the U.S. benchmark. All numbers are in % of the U.S. Benchmark.
Table 7. The impact of progressivity for different uses of additional revenue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Progressivity = $X\theta_{1US}$</th>
<th>Max. TR (% of benchmark)</th>
<th>$\max_{\text{TR}}(\text{prog} = X)$ of benchmark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g-curves</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>170.0</td>
<td>106.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>159.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>146.3</td>
<td>91.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>131.1</td>
<td>82.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b-curves</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>218.8</td>
<td>108.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>202.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>182.8</td>
<td>90.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>160.1</td>
<td>79.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>s-curves</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>179.4</td>
<td>107.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>167.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>152.4</td>
<td>91.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>135.7</td>
<td>81.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The middle column displays the maximum attainable tax revenue, relative to revenue in the calibrated benchmark economy. The right column displays the maximum tax revenue that can be raised relative to the peak of the $i$-Laffer curve, ($i \in \{g, b, s\}$), with U.S. progressivity.

debt service and ii) the larger holdings of government debt generates increased capital income tax receipts from the household sector. These two effects dominate the impact of debt crowding out productive capital. As the middle column of Table 7 shows, under current U.S. progressivity ($X\theta_{1US} = 1$), revenue can maximally be increased by 102.2%, and is achieved if the average labor income tax rate is increased to 54%. The right panel of Figure S5 shows that the U.S. could maximally sustain a debt burden of about 340% times of its benchmark GDP by increasing the average tax rate to 48%.46

Most importantly, as the last column of Table 7 displays, the impact of tax progressivity on the ability to generate revenue is qualitatively, and to a very large degree quantitatively robust to the alternative use of tax revenue (compare the last column across the top and the middle panel of the table). For the b-Laffer curve, a flat tax system raises 8.2% higher revenue than is feasible under current U.S. progressivity (previously 6.7%), whereas doubling progressivity results in revenue losses of 9.6% (previously 8.1%).

Finally, Figure S6 in the Appendix displays s-Laffer curves under the assumption that the increase in revenue is wasted (equivalently, enters household utility separately), and the bottom panel of Table 7 summarizes the salient observations. As with b-Laffer curves the absence of the income effect on labor supply from the benchmark g-curves implies that the ability of the government to generate extra revenue is strengthened (comparing middle column across the top and the bottom panel). Most crucially, however, the

46Note from Figure S5 that the tax rate which maximizes debt is substantially lower than the tax rate maximizing revenue. As government debt increases, the capital stock shrinks and the equilibrium interest rate rises, making it more expensive to service the debt.
impact of tax progressivity on the peak of the Laffer curve (third column of the table) is largely unaffected by the specification of what the government does with the extra revenue that is being generated with higher average tax rates.

8.3 Household heterogeneity and the Laffer curve

In Section 8.1 we have shown that tax progressivity is an important determinant of the government’s ability to generate revenue when raising the level of taxes, and have argued that the differential labor supply response of single and married females is important for this finding. In this section we document this last point in greater detail, by analyzing the Laffer curve in a sequence of alternative models, both in terms of its level as well as, crucially, in terms of the impact of tax progressivity.

8.3.1 Household heterogeneity and the level of tax revenues

In Figure 6, starting from the benchmark model of Section 5 (black solid line), we sequentially remove its key features pertaining to female labor supply: (i) the returns to female labor market experience (dotted line), (ii) the female participation margin (dashed line), and (iii) heterogeneity in family types, thus eliminating the distinction between single and married females. In the end, we arrive at a canonical standard life-cycle model inhabited by single households, differing only in initial earnings ability, and who are subject to idiosyncratic income risk (dash-dotted line). In that version of the model, we set the parameter $\eta$ which governs the Frisch elasticity of labor supply equal to $1/0.6$, the average for men and women used in the other models.

The figure shows that, relative to the standard life cycle model, female labor supply along the extensive margin, its associated impact on female wages, and the family structure in which females live in our benchmark model strongly reduce both the location of the peak of the Laffer curve as well as its level. The revenue-maximizing average tax rate falls from 64% to 58%, and the additional revenue the government can raise from 71% to 59%. Quantitatively, both the reduction of experience and thus wages of women working less, as well as their reduced labor force participation are important for this result, although the first effect is slightly more potent (moving from the solid to the dotted line in the figure).
The impact of average tax rates on revenue crucially depends on how responsive labor supply is to tax changes. Therefore, Table 8 displays simulated Frisch- and Marshall labor supply elasticities in the four different models. The table clearly indicates that the Frisch labor supply elasticity is highest in the two models with an extensive margin of labor supply for women, and the Marshall elasticity is highest in the full model. As the last column of the table demonstrate, the size of the peak of the Laffer curve across models is tightly linked to the corresponding labor supply elasticity.

8.3.2 The interaction between heterogeneity and progressivity

We now argue that the way female labor supply and family structure is modelled not only fundamentally impacts the government’s ability to raise extra revenue (as documented in the previous subsection), but also alters the impact of tax progressivity on maximal tax revenues. To show this, Table 9 displays the peak of the g-Laffer curve in the four different models from the previous subsection, as a function of the progressivity of the labor income tax code. For each model, we show peak tax revenue both relative to the calibrated benchmark revenue (the left column for each model) and relative to the peak of the Laffer curve with U.S. progressivity (the right column, so that the second row equals 100 for each model).

We observe that the negative impact of progressivity on total tax revenue is smaller in the benchmark model than in the simplified versions that abstract from various sources.

47The estimated Frisch elasticity is obtained by changing the wage at one age at a time, and then solving the model, keeping prices constant. Doing this for all ages and obtaining the average change in hours worked, we obtain an estimate of the Frisch elasticity. The Marshall elasticity, which is smaller than the Frisch elasticity due to the income effect, is obtained by changing the wage at all ages simultaneously. Note that even though \(1/\eta = 0.6\) in the simple life-cycle model, the simulated Frisch elasticity is not equal to 0.6, due to the progressive tax system in the model.

48In Section 8.4 below we analyze the effect of changing the parameter, \(\eta\), which governs the intensive margin labor supply elasticity, on the Laffer curve. We will document that the impact of making labor supply more or less elastic along the intensive margin on tax revenue differs significantly from the effect of adding human capital or an extensive margin of labor supply for women.

49The key distinction between the basic life cycle model and the model with different types of families (3rd and 4th row of the table) is the existence of low-elasticity high tax-paying males in the latter model, whereas the canonical life cycle model features homogeneous household types with higher labor supply elasticities (relative to males in the 3rd model).
Table 9. The impact of progressivity on maximum revenue in different models.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prog = $X\theta_{1US}$</th>
<th>Full model</th>
<th>Exog. human capital</th>
<th>No ext. margin</th>
<th>Life cycle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$TR/\text{TR}_{\text{Bench}}$</td>
<td>$TR(\text{prog}=X)/\text{TR}(\text{prog}=1)$</td>
<td>$TR/\text{TR}_{\text{Bench}}$</td>
<td>$TR(\text{prog}=X)/\text{TR}(\text{prog}=1)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>169.9</td>
<td>106.7</td>
<td>179.5</td>
<td>107.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>159.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>167.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>146.3</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>152.9</td>
<td>91.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>131.1</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>136.1</td>
<td>81.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The columns labeled $TR/\text{TR}_{\text{Bench}}$ display how much revenue that is raised relative to the calibrated benchmark for each model. The columns labeled $TR(\text{prog}=X)/\text{TR}(\text{prog}=1)$ display how much revenue that is raised relative to the maximum that can be raised under current U.S. progressivity.
of household heterogeneity. Quantitatively, however, the impact of tax progressivity on the peak of the Laffer curve is quite robust across the different versions of the model. A priori, one would expect that an operative extensive margin of female labor supply weakens the impact of an increase in tax progressivity on revenue since the reduction of average tax rates at the low end of the wage distribution induces more females to participate. However, this logic only holds for single women. For married women, who are taxed jointly with their husbands, the effect is exactly the opposite. Many two-earner households with high-earning males find it optimal, with a more progressive tax system, to only have the male working. In Figure 7 we plot female labor force participation for single (left panel) and married women (right panel) by tax level and progressivity. As can be seen from the figure higher progressivity consistently leads to higher labor force participation for single women and lower labor force participation for married women.

This differential labor force participation response strongly affects the group-specific Laffer curves, which we plot in Figure 8. As can be seen from the figure the effect of progressivity is very different for single and married women. Around the peak rate of the Laffer curve for the population as a whole (approximately 59%), revenue generated from single females is increasing in tax progressivity (see the left panel), whereas the effect of progressivity is strongly negative for married females. Once aggregating across different family types the effect of progressivity on single females dominates and thus the peak of the Laffer curve is less responsive in the full benchmark model than in versions that abstract from extensive margin and family type differences. However, due to strongly offsetting effect on married female participation, quantitatively the impact of progressivity on tax revenue for the economy as a whole population does not differ fundamentally between our model and the simple life-cycle structure.50

50One may wonder what the presence of an extensive margin and endogenously accumulated labor market experience would do in a model with only single households. In Figure S7 in the Appendix we plot the peaks of the Laffer curves for the four models in this section, as a function of tax progressivity, together with...
Finally, note that progressivity mattering slightly less when introducing endogenous human capital accumulation (full vs exogenous human capital model in Table 9) can be interpreted as labor supply becoming more inelastic around the female extensive margin.51

8.4 Sensitivity analysis: The importance of the labor supply elasticity

The elasticity of labor supply along the intensive margin naturally also plays a key role for the shape of the Laffer curve. In our benchmark calibration we set the values of the parameters $\eta^m$ and $\eta^w$ that govern the intensive margin labor supply elasticity52 to $1/0.4$ and $1/0.8$. In Figure S2 in Appendix A.11 we plot Laffer curves for different levels of tax the peaks for a model with single households who has an extensive margin of labor supply and accumulate experience. The figure demonstrates that tax progressivity has a much smaller effect on the Laffer curve in a model with only singles and extensive margin labor choice.

51 Note that the finding that introducing endogenous human capital accumulation slightly reduces, and does not increase the impact of tax progressivity may depend crucially on how human capital accumulation is modelled. When human capital is interpreted as years of labor market experience, making taxes more progressive increases the short term benefit of acquiring human capital. This effect counteracts the impact of progressive taxes reducing the longer time returns to human capital. In this context, progressive taxes affect the human capital accumulation decisions of those on the margin between working and not working. These are typically low earners who will obtain a higher net wage (at least in the short run) when taxes become more progressive. If human capital was instead modelled as an investment of resources in education quality or as a time-investment in learning, the introduction of human capital may instead amplify the negative impacts of tax progressivity. See Holter (2015) for a model where human capital accumulation is modelled as a continuous investment of resources in education quality and Badel, Huggett, and Luo (2017) for a model where human capital accumulation is modelled as investment of time in learning. Both of these studies apply a Ben-Porath (1967) human capital production technology. The human capital investment decisions of the whole distribution of workers and not only those at the margin between working and not working will be affected by tax progressivity under these alternative modelling strategies.

52 Note that since the tax system is progressive, the intensive margin labor supply elasticity in the model is in general smaller than $1/\eta$. 
progressivity when we double the Frisch labor supply elasticity of both males and females, and when we cut it in half.\(^{53}\)

The intensive margin labor supply elasticity has significant impact on the level of the Laffer curve and the location of its peak. With current U.S. progressivity doubling the elasticity parameters \(1/\eta\) reduces the peak from \((\tau = 57.9\%, TR = 159.3\%)\) to \((54.9\%, 147.3\%)\) and cutting it in half shifts the peak up to \((67.5\%, 171.8\%)\). Compared to changing the model's labor supply elasticity along the extensive margin, as we did in the previous section by shutting down the key model elements associated with the extensive margin of labor supply of females, simply adjusting the intensive margin of labor supply leads to much stronger changes in the location of the peak (the revenue-maximizing rate), but smaller impact on the associated revenue.\(^{54}\) Finally, the impact of tax progressivity is unambiguously and very significantly larger (and negative), the larger is the intensive margin labor supply elasticity. This is in stark contrast with the findings in Section 8.3.2, Table 9, which showed that shutting down the extensive margin made the impact of tax progressivity larger. We conclude that simply changing the intensive margin labor supply elasticity has very different effects on the shape of Laffer curve, and especially the impact of tax progressivity on the curve, than introducing an explicit extensive margin of female labor supply and its impact on human capital accumulation. Both thought experiments are important when conducting applied policy analysis, but in our view they complement, rather than substitute each other.

9. Conclusion

In this paper we quantify the impact of the progressivity of the labor income tax code on the Laffer curve, and thus, on the maximal ability of the government to raise revenue. We conclude that the U.S. is currently far from the peak of its Laffer curve and could increase tax revenue by an additional 59% if the government were to raise the average labor income tax rate to 58%. A more progressive tax code raises significantly less revenue. Since, as we document in the paper, there is substantial variation across countries in the shape of the income tax code, cross-country heterogeneity in tax progressivity is an important aspect for international comparisons of Laffer curves.

We have argued that in order to quantify the effect of tax progressivity on the Laffer curve it is crucial to model explicitly the extensive margin of labor supply, the associated accumulation of experience, and the heterogeneity across families in the number of income earners. We found that in the presence of an extensive margin of labor supply, making taxes more progressive increases the labor force participation of single women. Higher labor force participation and more labor market experience thus counteract the negative effect of tax progressivity on labor supply along the intensive margin. For married women, who are taxed jointly with their husbands, the effect is exactly the opposite.

\(^{53}\)In both cases we recalibrate the model to match the same data moments as the original benchmark model, by changing the parameters listed in Table 3.

\(^{54}\)For example, compare the change of maximal revenue from cutting the Frisch elasticity in half (from 159.3% to 171.8%) to the effect of removing the extensive margin and associated human capital accumulation, (from 159.3% to 175.0%, last column of Table 8).
When taxes become more progressive, the labor force participation and labor market experience of these females declines very significantly.

In this paper we have focused on a positive analysis of fiscal policy. Given the very substantial effect of tax progressivity on revenue and the cross-country differences in this progressivity, our results beg the question: what degree of progressivity is optimal from a normative perspective, in the context of our model? Furthermore, what political factors determine why Denmark has chosen such substantially more progressive tax code than the U.S.? We view these as natural next questions for future work.

References


Co-editor Karl Schmedders handled this manuscript.

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